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Abstract 
As the financial performance of entities is of extreme importance to stakeholders in general and shareholders in particular (by 
helping to maintain a going concern and to increase the value of the business), it should appear as straightforward that identifying 
and analyzing those factors (determinants) that influence the financial performance is of great relevance both to practice and the 
academic world. It is logical (however not undisputed) to suppose that the managerial abilities of the board of directors would 
have a significant impact on the entity’s financial performance. It is however not clear-cut whether certain board characteristics 
regarding its compensation would significantly influence the financial performance of the entity. Within this context, the aim of 
this research is to investigate (based on econometric regression models) the impact of 5 corporate governance characteristics 
related to board remuneration on the contemporaneous and next year’s performance (measured as ROA/ROE) using a sample of 
large groups listed on the London Stock Exchange between 2010 and 2011. Through this study we intend to make a contribution 
to the academic literature on the unsettled issue concerning the relationship between corporate governance and corporate 
performance. The empirical results proved a significant relationship between non-executive directors’ basic fee, fees paid in 
shares and additional remuneration for board committee membership (as corporate board compensation characteristics) and both 
contemporaneous and subsequent financial firm performance.  
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1. Introduction 
The financial performance of entities is of extreme importance to stakeholders in general and shareholders in 
particular, as it helps to maintain a going concern and to increase the value of the business, and offers the basis for 
distributing dividends, which in turn may attract investors (and their funds). Thus, it appears as straightforward that 
identifying and analyzing those determinants that influence financial performance is of great relevance. While on 
one hand it is logical (but not undisputed) to suppose that the managerial abilities of the board of directors would 
have a significant impact on the entity’s financial performance, on the other hand it is not clear-cut whether certain 
board characteristics regarding its remuneration would significantly influence the company’s performance.  
The aim of this research is to investigate (based on econometric regression models) the impact of 5 corporate 
governance characteristics related to board remuneration on the contemporaneous and next year’s performance 
(measured as ROA) using a sample of large groups listed on the London Stock Exchange between 2010 and 2011. 
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Through this research we intend to contribute to the academic literature on the unsettled issue concerning the 
relationship between corporate governance and corporate performance.  
There are several academic papers which investigated the relationship between corporate governance 
characteristics and corporate performance. Gompers et al. (2003) study in their often cited paper the impact of 
corporate governance on firm performance during the 1990’s. Using 24 governance rules, the authors construct a 
Governance index to proxy for the level of shareholder rights. The results the authors arrive at, indicate that 
companies with stronger shareholder rights had higher firm value, higher performance and higher sales growth than 
companies with weak shareholder rights. However in a subsequent paper, Core et al. (2006) showed that in the first 
decade of this century, firms with strong shareholder rights do not outperform firms with weak shareholder rights.  
Another seminal paper concerning the relation between corporate governance and firm performance is that of 
Bhagat and Bolton (2008). Taking into consideration the endogeneity of the relationship between corporate 
governance, group performance, corporate structure and ownership structure, the authors found that better corporate 
governance is significantly positively correlated with both better contemporaneous and better subsequent operating 
performance (but not with stock market performance).  
In her paper, Bauwhede (2009) re-examines the relationship between corporate governance and corporate 
performance, triggered by a prior European study (Bauer et al., 2004) which reported evidence of a negative 
relationship between these constructs. However, Bauwhede reports evidence of a positive relationship between the 
extent of compliance with international corporate governance best practices (regarding board structure and 
functioning) and operating performance measured by the return on assets (ROA). According to the author, it is 
especially the structure and functioning of the corporate board that can directly impact on the operating efficiency 
and operating performance of a company. 
Relevant to our research is also the study of Guest (2009) who examines the influence of board size on company 
performance for a large sample of UK listed firms during 1981-2002. The results indicate that board size has a 
strong negative impact on performance (profitability), Tobin’s Q and share returns. 
2. Research Design and Descriptive Statistics 
In this empirical research we investigated the relationship between company performance and board 
compensation characteristics for companies listed on the largest European stock market (London Stock exchange – 
FTSE100) in the period 2010-2011. The research relies on an accounting measure of company performance (return 
on assets) as dependent variable as a proxy for company performance.  
The financial information on operating performance, total assets, shareholders equity, total sales as well as 
information concerning the industry in which the constituents of FTSE 100 operate, has been manually collected 
from the London Stock Exchange website. The data on characteristics regarding corporate board compensation have 
been obtained from the SpencerStuart 2011 UK Board Index. We constructed the different dependent and 
independent variables, including control variables (for size respectively for industry). Regarding the elimination of 
outliers, we truncated the observations for which the dependent variable (ROA) were below the 5th respectively 
above the 95th percentile.  
The central hypothesis of this research, which is based on prior findings in academic research, is the following: 
Hypothesis 1: There are corporate board compensation characteristics (such as chair remuneration, non-
executive director remuneration, fees paid in shares, additional remuneration for board committee meetings) which 
may significantly influence the current year operating performance of  companies. 
In order to empirically test this research hypothesis regarding the impact of board remuneration characteristics on 
the contemporaneous operating performance, the following econometric model (whose parameters are to be 
estimated using ordinary least square OLS) has been developed: 
 
ROAni = α0 + α1*ChairRemi + α2* SenNExRemi + α3* NonExBasFeei + α4* FeesInSharesi + α5* 
AddRemBComMembi + α6*TAi + ∑(αi*Indi) + εi           (1) 
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Where: 
ROAni = Operating Return on Assets of company i in year n 
ChairRemi = Chairman remuneration for company i 
SenNExRemi = Senior non-executive total remuneration for company i 
NonExBasFeei = Non-executive director basic fee for company i 
FeesInSharesi = Fees paid in shares (dummy: 1 – yes, 0 – no) for company i 
AddRemBComMembi = Additional remuneration for board committee members for company i 
TAi = Natural logarithm of total assets for company i 
Indi = Industry dummy variable for the following industries: Basic Materials, Industrials, 
Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Utilities, Financials, Other 
 
Moreover the research was further designed to investigate the impact of board compensation characteristics on 
the subsequent (i.e. next year) operating performance, thus following a research idea explored by Bhagat & Bolton 
(2008). Thus a second hypothesis based on the initial one has been formulated: 
Hypothesis 2: There are corporate board compensation characteristics (such as chair remuneration, non-
executive director remuneration, fees paid in shares, additional remuneration for board committee meetings) which 
may significantly influence the next year’s operating performance of  companies. 
For empirically testing this research hypothesis regarding the impact of board related corporate governance 
characteristics on the next year’s operating performance, a second similar econometric model (whose parameters are 
to be estimated using ordinary least square OLS) hase been developed: 
 
ROAn+1i = α0 + α1*ChairRemi + α2* SenNExRemi + α3* NonExBasFeei + α4* FeesInSharesi + α5* 
AddRemBComMembi + α6*TAi + ∑(αi*Indi) + εi       (2) 
Where: 
ROAn+1i = Operating Return on Assets of company i in year n + 1 
 
As in other previous studies (see Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998, Guest, 2009) the regression models include a 
control variable for the company size (natural logarithm of total assets) and dummy variables which control for the 
industry family the company primarily operates in (Basic Materials, Industrials, Consumer Goods, Consumer 
Services, Utilities, Financials, Other). These control variables are used to capture the influence of size and sector on 
company’s performance, thus improving the explanatory power of the elaborated regression models. In order to 
confirm a research hypothesis, the coefficient of at least one variable concerning the specific board remuneration 
characteristic has to be statistically significant at the 0,1 level and has to record a Variance Inflation Factor (which 
tests the degree to which the independent variable is correlated with other independent variables) below 5. 
Otherwise the respective hypothesis is considered to be infirmed. Regarding the existent associations between the 
variables employed in the econometric models (see Pearson correlation matrix in table 1), there are two significant 
(at least at the 5% level) correlations between the dependent variable (ROA) and the independent variables 
ChairRem (Chair remuneration), respectively SenNExRem (Senior non-executive remuneration).   
 
Table 1. Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 
Variable ROA n ROA n+1 ChairRem SenNExRem NonExBasFee FeesInShares 
ROAn+1 0,878**    
ChairRem -0,219* -0,192   
SenNExRem -0,257* -0,195 0,529**     
NonExBasFee -0,098 -0,086 0,528** 0,589**    
FeesInShares -0,098 -0,018 0,196 0,162 0,038   
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AddRemBComMemb -0,015 0,031 0,278** 0,278** 0,135 0,166 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
One can also observe the existence of significant correlations between some independent variables used in the 
same econometric models. We are referring to the correlation between ChairRem and SenNExRem, NonExBaseFee 
respectively AddRemBComMemb, and the correlations between FoSenNExRem and NonExBaseFee, respectively 
AddRemBComMemb. These correlations are small or moderate and indicate the existence of a certain 
multicollinearity between variables. To examine if multicollinearity generates instability of empirical results, we 
computed, for each coefficient of the independent variables from the econometric models, the variance inflation 
factor (VIF), which quantifies to what extent the variance for a coefficient is increased due to collinearity (Andrei & 
Bourbonnais, 2008: 274). When variables are not correlated, the variance inflation factor is 1. VIF values of more 
than 5 (see Jermakowicz et al., 2007) or even 10 (see Kutner et al., 2004) are regarded in the specialty literature as 
indication of (seriouss) autocorrelation problems between independent variables. 
3. Empirical Results 
The main results for the relationship between the operating performance measured as return on assets (for the 
current period) and the board compensation characteristics are summarized in table 2. These results are consistent 
with a statistically significant relationship (at least at 0,1 level) between the contemporaneous operating 
performance (measured as ROA) and some of the corporate governance characteristics regarding board 
remuneration, namely the non-executive director basic fee, the fees paid in shares and the additional remuneration 
for board committee members.  
 
Table 2. Empirical results for regression model 1  
 
Variable Coefficients (α) t Sig. VIF 
(Constant) 0,238** 2,147 0,036   
ChairRem 0,000 -0,474 0,637 2,833 
SenNExRem 0,000 -1,48 0,144 3,213 
NonExBasFee 0,002*** 3,375 0,001 3,222 
FeesInShares 0,025* 1,697 0,095 1,564 
AddRemBComMemb 0,037*** 3,674 0,001 1,611 
TAn -0,033*** -5,628 0,000 4,943 
IndBasMat 0,045 2,596 0,012 2,814 
IndInd -0,048 -2,770 0,008 2,796 
IndConsGoods -0,008 -0,428 0,67 2,004 
IndConsServ 0,000 -0,032 0,975 2,21 
IndUtilities 0,028 1,349 0,183 2,012 
IndFinancials 0,012 0,648 0,519 3,353 
IndOther 0,020 0,973 0,334 1,684 
Model Summary ROAn AdjR2   0,561 F    4,879 Durbin-Watson   1,972 
 
The relatively strongest (and statistically significant) impact on ROA can be observed for the additional 
remuneration for board committee members. Noticeable is also the relationships involving ROA and the variable for 
the fees paid in shares. As concerns the potential problem of multicollinearity between independent variables included in 
the two models, which generates instability of empirical results, we computed, for each coefficient of the independent 
variables from the econometric models, the variance inflation factor.  
As the VIF values are less than 5, there is no indication of (serious) autocorrelation problems between independent 
variables. Based on this statistical results for the first regression model, we consider confirmed the hypothesis 1, 
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regarding a significant relationship between corporate board compensation and contemporaneous company 
performance. 
As mentioned in the research design, we also investigated the impact of board compensation characteristics on 
the subsequent (i.e. next year) operating performance, thus following a research idea explored by Bhagat & Bolton 
(2008). The existence of statistically significant coefficients for the board related independent variables in the 
regression model based on subsequent ROA would definitely strengthen a presumable conclusion regarding the 
existence of an impact which certain board remuneration characteristics might have on company performance.  The 
empirical results obtained from this regression model are synthesized in table 3.   
 
Table 3. Empirical results for regression model 2 
 
Variable Coefficients (α) t Sig. VIF 
(Constant) 0,327*** 2,837 0,006 0 
ChairRem 0,000 -1,34 0,186 3,026 
SenNExRem 0,000 -0,419 0,677 3,536 
NonExBasFee 0,001* 1,977 0,053 3,36 
FeesInShares 0,021 1,31 0,195 1,536 
AddRemBComMemb 0,043*** 4,086 0,000 1,601 
TAn -0,028*** -4,299 0,000 5,857 
IndBasMat 0,050 2,965 0,020 2,814 
IndIndustrials -0,048 -2,77 0,008 2,796 
IndConsGoods -0,037 -1,759 0,084 2,616 
IndConsServ -0,049 -2,683 0,01 2,805 
IndUtilities -0,055 -2,57 0,013 2,219 
IndFinancials -0,079 -3,765 0 3,505 
IndOther 0,005 0,215 0,83 2,272 
Model SummaryROAn+1 AdjR2   0,561 F    4,887 Durbin-Watson   1,983 
 
These results indicate a statistically significant relationship (at least at 0,1 level) between next year’s operating 
performance (measured as ROA) and the corporate governance characteristics regarding de non-executive basic fee 
and the additional remuneration for board committee members. It should be noticed that the coefficient for the the 
additional remuneration for board committee members has even a higher positive value as compared to model 1 
(based on contemporaneous ROA), which might indicate that this compensation component has a stronger influence 
on the performance on the longer term. 
Concerning the potential problem of multicollinearity between independent variables included in the second model 
(which generates instability of empirical results), the computed variance inflation factor (VIF) values are less than 5, thus 
not indicating (serious) autocorrelation problems between independent variables. 
Based on these empirical results obtained from the second regression model which contains statistically relevant 
coefficients we confirm the hypotheses 2, regarding a significant link between corporate board compensation and 
subsequent operating performance. 
4. Summary and Conclusions 
The aim of this study was to investigate (based on econometric regression models) the impact of several board 
compensation characteristics on contemporaneous and subsequent (next year’s) performance using a sample of large 
groups listed on the largest European capital market (namely London Stock Exchange) between 2010 and 2011. The 
selected companies are the constituents of FTSE 100.  
The study has used an accounting measure of operating performance, namely the operating return on assets 
(ROA). In order to investigate the profoundness of a potential impact of corporate board remuneration 
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characteristics on company performance, we explored the influence of these characteristics both on 
contemporaneous and on subsequent (next year’s) operating performance.  
As hypothesized and in accordance with some previous researches (for example Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998, 
Gompers et al, 2003, Guest, 2009, Bhagat & Bolton, 2008) we found a statistically significant relationship between 
some corporate governance characteristics and firm performance (both contemporaneous and subsequent). The 
empirical results proved a statistically significant relationship between non-executive directors’ basic fee, fees paid 
in shares and additional remuneration for board committee membership (as corporate board compensation 
characteristics) and both contemporaneous and subsequent financial firm performance. However, the chair 
remuneration and the senior non-executive remuneration seem not to significantly influence company performance. 
In the end, at least two limitations are worth mentioning. First, it is possible to raise the problem of sample 
representativeness (and implicitly of the results obtained) for the large European capital markets and respectively for 
the whole European capital market. In this respect, future research could extend the analysis (and the sample) to 
other capital markets in Europe, as well as to companies that are not included in the main index of the stock market 
they are listed on. Second, the obtained results do not take into account the possibile endogeneity of the relationships 
among corporate governance (including board remuneration), operating performance, corporate structure and 
ownership structure. 
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